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requested the court to consider placing Papse on probation.

(Sentencing Tr.,

p.31, L.25 - p.32., L.3. 4) In response, the prosecutor argued:
Yeah, I think this presentence pretty much speaks for itself
when you look at that prior record. I was just looking through them,
and I guess what concerns me the most is that his crimes have not
slowed down in the past 30, 40 years. In the sixties he had four
crimes, one of which was a DUI; in the seventies, three, two of
which were a felony; in the eighties, four crimes, three felonies; in
the nineties three crimes, but no felonies; and then you look at
2000, and he's got as many or more in the decade beginning in
2000 than he does in any of those other decades: Sixties,
seventies, eighties, nineties. The four prior decades prior to 2000,
he's got more crimes that he's committed so far this decade.
So Mr. Papse is not slowing down. He might be 60 years
oid, but his criminal record is continuing on a rapid pace. So I think
in the factors that the Court needs to consider in imposing a
sentence, I think that protecting society is most important. And,
obviously, [defense counsel] alluded to that in his comments.
So although Mr. Papse might be hoping for probation today,
think that prison is the only alternative in this case. So it's, I
guess, with great enthusiasm today that I come before the Court
and recommend to the Court a four-year prison sentence with
those first two years fixed.
·
(Sentencing Tr., p.32, L.13 - p.33, L.15.) Following the prosecutor's sentencing
recommendation, defense counsel argued:
Well, that was enthusiasm from the part of the prosecutor,
and I-

Well, it's just that, you know, in the course of coming up with
a plea agreement, as I'm sure that the Court is aware, when we get
a recommendation from the prosecutor, we hope that it at least
would be something other than an argument for not taking that
recommendation and then giving it.

The transcript of the sentencing hearing (Sentencing Tr.) was attached to
Papse's affidavit in support of his post-conviction petition and appears at pages
20 through 24 of the clerk's record.
4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 28565
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.:1~1\1ES MURPHY KENNEDY,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________

)
)
)
)

2003 Opinion No. 38
Filed: May 12, 2003
Frederick C. Lyon, Clerk

)
)
)
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of seven years, with a minimum
period of confinement of two years, for trafficking in methamphetamine by
attempted manufacture, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Paul S. Sonenberg, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Ralph Reed Blount, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
PERRY, Judge
James Murphy Kennedy appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his plea
of guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine by attempted manufacturing. We affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand.
Kennedy was charged with conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine by manufacturing.

In the midst of trial, Kennedy entered into a plea agreemeµt with the state whereby he agreed to
plead guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine by attempted manufacturing.

LC. § 37-

2732B(a)(3). Defense counsel summarized the plea agreement by stating that "Kennedy will
plead to Count 1, an attempt to manufacture, the state will recommend two years fixed required
by the statute, will not make a recommendation on an indeterminate, leave that in the judge's
discretion." The district court thereafter accepted Kennedy's guilty plea.

I

At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor acknowledged the plea agreement.

After

discussing the facts of the case, Kennedy's longstanding substance abuse problem, and
Kennedy's criminal history, the prosecutor made the following recommendation:
I think the two years fixed, Judge, is appropriate, and I think a substantial period
of indeterminate time is warranted in this defendant's case. Not necessarily,
Judge, so that he can serve a lot more time in the penitentiary, but obviously given
his history, given the serious nature of this offense and his activities in this
offense, as well as his attitude and disposition in the presentence investigation,
he's an individual for which I think that the Department of Correction needs to
have a substantial period of supervision of this man.
Kennedy did not object to the prosecutor's comments. The district court imposed a unified
seven-year sentence, with a minimum period of confinement of two years.
Kennedy now appeals, asserting that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by
recommending that the indeterminate portion of Kennedy's sentence be substantial. Kennedy
seeks specific performance of the plea agreement, arguing that his case should be remanded for
resentencing before a different district judge.
We note at the outset that Kennedy did not object to the prosecutor's recommendation of
a substantial indeterminate sentence, nor did he move to withdraw his guilty plea. Ordinarily,
this Court will not address an issue not preserved for appeal by an objection in the trial court.

State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 645, 945 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Ct. App. 1997). However, we
may consider fundamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made below.

See id. Fundamental error has been defined as error which goes to the foundation or basis of a
defendant's rights, goes to the foundation of the case or takes from the defendant a right which
was essential to his or her defense and which no court could or ought to permit to be waived.

State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 940, 877 P.2d 905, 911 (1994). Breach of a plea agreement by the
state is fundamental error and, therefore, the failure to seek relief in the trial court does not
preclude a defendant from raising the issue for the first time on appeal if the record is adequate
for_thatpurpose. State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 744, 52 P.3d 886,889 (Ct. App. 2002); State

v. Brooke, 134 Idaho 807, 809, 10 P.3d 756, 758 (Ct. App. 2000). Here, the transcript of the plea
hearing sufficiently establishes the terms of the plea agreement, and we will consequently
address Kennedy's claim of breach.
When a plea res~ in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor,
so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
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fulfilled. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). This principle is grounded in the
Due Process Clause and the well-established rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both
voluntary and intelligent. Afabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1984). See also State v.
Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910,913,693 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Ct. App. 1985).

Thus, when the

prosecution breaches its promise with respect to a plea agreement, the defendant pleads guilty on
a false premise and is entitled to relief. Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509; State v. Seaman, 125 Idaho 955,
957, 877 P.2d 926,928 (Ct. App. 1994). As a remedy, the court may order specific performance
of the plea agreement or may permit the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea. Santobello, 404
U.S. at 263; Seaman, 125 Idaho at 957, 877 P.2d at 928; Rutherford, 107 Idaho at 916, 693 P.2d
at 1118.
Under the circumstances presented in the instant case, we conclude that Kennedy has
established that the state breached the plea agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the prosecutor
promised not to make a recommendation regarding the indeterminate portion of Kennedy's
sentence. Although the prosecutor did not recommend a specific indeterminate length, this Court
notes that the agreement precluded the prosecutor from making any recommendation relative to
the indeterminate term, including a recommendation that the indeterminate term of Kennedy's
sentence be "substantial."
Although Kennedy appeals from his judgment of conviction, he is not requesting to
withdraw his guilty plea. Rather, Kennedy seeks specific performance of the plea agreement and
resentencing before a different district judge who will not have heard the prosecutor's improper
recommendation. Because Kennedy has requested relief in the form of specific performance,
and because he has shown that he is entitled to such relief, we conclude that specific
performance of the plea agreement is an appropriate remedy in this case. See Rutherford, I 07
Idaho at 916, 693 P .2d at 1118. Therefore, we affirm Kennedy's judgment of conviction for
trafficking in methamphetamine by attempted manufacturing, but we vacate Kennedy's sentence
and-remand the case for resentencing before a different district judge.
Chief Judge LANSING and Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCUR.
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MELANSON, Judge
Kirk Julliard Gosch appeals from the district court's judgment dismissing his petition for
post-conviction relief. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate and remand.

I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Gosch was found guilty by a jury of manufacturing a controlled substance, I.C. § 372732(a); possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, LC. § 37-2732(a); and possession of
marijuana in excess of three ounces, I.C. § 37-2732(e). Gosch filed a petition for post-conviction
relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel
provided erroneous advice as to the potential consequences of filing an appeal. At an evidentiary
hearing on this claim, Gosch asserted that he also received ineffective assistance of counsel
because he asked counsel to file an appeal in his underlying criminal case, but no appeal was
ever filed. The state did not object to the presentation of this additional claim at the evidentiary

hearing, the parties argued the merits, and the district court considered the claim. In the district
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the judgment dismissing Gosch's
petition, the district court determined that Gosch' s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
failed. Gosch appeals.
II.
ANALYSIS

Gosch argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his petition for postconviction relief because he demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
based upon his trial counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal in his underlying criminal case
despite Gosch's unequivocal request that counsel do so. 1 Thus, Gosch asserts that his case must
be remanded to the district court for entry of an amended judgment of conviction to allow him to
perfect a timely appeal.
Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature and therefore the petitioner must prove the
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 699-700, 992
P .2d 144, 148-49 (1999). On review, the appellate court will not disturb the lower court's factual
findings unless the factual findings are clearly erroneous. Id. at 700, 992 P.2d at 149. The
credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be
drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. Peterson
v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct App. 2003). The appellate court exercises free

review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Dunlap v. State, 141
Idaho 50, 56, l 06 P.3d 376, 382 (2004).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the postconviction procedure act. A1urray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct.
App. I 992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show
that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the
deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U..§.: 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho

313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To e ~a deficiency, the petitioner has the

Gosch does not challenge the district court's determination that Gosch's claim that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel provided erroneous advice as
to the potential consequences of filing an appeal failed.
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burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish
prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different Id at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177.
The district court found that, after the jury rendered its verdict, Gosch left the courthouse
with his counsel in a confused and stressful state and informed counsel that he wanted to "appeal
everything." The district court also found that, upon making such request, counsel directed
Gosch to contact counsel's office the next day by scheduling an appointment because counsel
wanted to allow Gosch time "to digest the verdict, and more clearly articulate exactly what he
wanted to appeal."

The district court found that, thereafter, Gosch never scheduled an

appointment and never spoke with counsel regarding an appeal. Additionally, the district court
found that counsel made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Gosch following his request to
"appeal everything," including an attempt to make the public defender's investigator available to
Gosch prior to his sentencing.

The district court also found that Gosch was notified at

sentencing of his right to appeal.
The district court correctly noted that, pursuant to Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 36162, 883 P.2d 714, 719-20 (Ct. App. 1994), a defendant who proves that he or she was denied an
appeal because counsel did not file an appeal as requested states a meritorious claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel because the loss of the right to appeal is sufficient prejudice, in
and of itself, to support such claim. In that case, Beasley filed a petition for post-conviction
relief, asserting he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to file an
appeal from Beasley's judgment of conviction. Beasley and his trial counsel testified at the
hearing on his petition. Following the hearing, the district court denied relief and dismissed the
petition, concluding that Beasley failed on his claim to show deficient performance by counsel or
prejudice sufficient to satisfy the two-pronged standard for ineffective assistance derived from

Strickland. Beasley, 126 Idaho at 359, 883 P.2d at 717.
On appeal, this Court noted that it was undisputed that Beasley advised his counsel of his
desire to appeal his conviction and that the record clearly showed that counsel understood
Beasley desired to appeal.

We determined that the loss of the opportunity to appeal due to

counsel's failure to file an appeal when a criminal defendant requested that counsel do so was
sufficient prejudice to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Beasley, 126 Idaho at
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362, 883 P.2d at 720. Having determined that Beasley's counsel either neglected or refused to
file an appeal despite Beasley's request, we concluded that deficient performance of counsel
deprived Beasley of his opportunity to appeal and that prejudice was presumed from such
performance.

Id

Accordingly, Beasley's judgment of conviction had to be vacated and

reentered so Beasley could perfect a timely appeal. Id.
Here, at the hearing on Gosch's petition, the district court stated:
I think this case is distinguishable from Beasley in the sense that Mr.
Gosch was afforded an opportunity to discuss an appeal. He was invited to make
an appointment to discuss it And he failed to follow up on multiple opportunities
to do so. The Court finds that based upon the distinguishing facts that he did not
make a request after the judgment was filed, he did not make an appointment after
he was invited to do so, that the Beasley rule doesn't apply. There was no binding
request for an appeal to be filed. Accordingly, the petition is denied.
In the written conclusions of law, the district court stated that Beasley was distinguishable from
Gosch's case "because Beasley requested an appeal of his conviction, and the record clearly
showed that trial counsel, and the public defender who assumed representation of Beasley after
entry of his judgment of conviction, understood that Beasley desired to appeal."
Relying upon Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 792 P.2d 964 (Ct. App. 1990); State v.

Dillard, 110 Idaho 834, 718 P.2d 1272 (Ct. App. 1986); and Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 191, 657
P.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1983), the district court properly concluded that its decision should be based
on whether Gosch' s desire to appeal was adequately communicated to his counsel and whether
counsel's failure to file an appeal resulted from deficient performance that deprived Gosch of the
opportunity to appeal. The district court then reiterated that, in this case, Gosch made a single
request to "appeal everything" during a time of confusion and stress directly after the jury
rendered its verdict and before a sentence or judgment had been entered. The district court again
noted that, while Gosch's counsel directed him to set up an appointment to discuss a potential
appeal, Gosch did not thereafter contact counsel or respond to attempted correspondence from
counsel and never again evidenced a desire to appeal. The district court determined that Gosch's
request to appeal was not ignored by counsel but, rather, Gosch ignored counsel. The district
court also determined that it was not counsel's inaction that caused Gosch to not appeal, but
Gosch's own inaction that resulted in failure to file an appeal. Thus, the district court concluded
that Gosch' s request was not fully and fairly communicated to counsel so as to warrant a
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conclusion that it was counsel's ineffective assistance that deprived Gosch of the opportunity to
appeaL

The district court finally concluded that counsel reasonably believed Gosch had

abandoned any desire to file an appeal because Gosch ignored counsel's repeated attempts to
communicate with Gosch regarding an appeal.

Accordingly, the district court entered a

judgment dismissing Gosch' s petition.
It is undisputed that, after the jury rendered its verdict, Gosch requested that counsel
"appeal everything." It is also undisputed that, thereafter, Gosch's counsel never filed an appeal.
We conclude that the district court erred in determining that Gosch's case is distinguishable from

Beasley such that Beasely does not apply in this case because Gosch requested that his counsel
"appeal everything" after the jury rendered its verdict as opposed to after sentencing and entry of
judgment. Specifically, LC. § 19-2317 provides:
When the verdict given is such as the court may receive, the clerk must
immediately record it in full upon the minutes, read it to the jury, and inquire of
them whether it is their verdict. If any juror disagree, the fact must be entered
upon the minutes and the jury again sent out; but if no disagreement is expressed,
the verdict is complete, and the jury must be discharged from the case.
A legal conviction occurs when a verdict or plea of guilty is accepted by the court. State v.

Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273,278,581 P.2d 319,324 (1978). Idaho Appellate Rule l7(e)(2) provides
that a notice of appeal filed from an appealable judgment or order before formal written entry of
such document shall become valid upon the filing and placing of the stamp of the clerk of the
court on such appealable judgment or order, without refiling the notice of appeal. Therefore,
Gosch' s attorney could have filed an appeal after the jury rendered its verdict, but before entry of
judgment, and such appeal would have become valid upon the filing and placing of the stamp of
the clerk upon such judgment and without refiling. Thus, it is of no consequence that Gosch's
request that counsel file an appeal occurred after the jury rendered its verdict as opposed to after
sentencing and the entry of judgment 2
The district court also erred in ruling that Beasley does not apply in this case because the
record does not show Gosch's counsel did not understand that Gosch desired to appeal. At the
hearing on Gosch's petition, Gosch's counsel testified that, after the jury rendered its verdict and
2

We do not address a request to appeal a conviction made prior to the jury reaching a

verdict.
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counsel left the courthouse with Gosch, he requested that counsel "appeal everything." Thus, the
record shows that Gosch's counsel understood that Gosch desired to appeal.
Similarly, the district court erred in ruling that Gosch's request to file an appeal was not
fully and fairly communicated to counsel because, after making such request, Gosch did not
schedule an appointment with counsel as directed and did not respond to counsel's attempted
correspondence prior to sentencing to discuss a potential appeal. This case is unlike Sanders
where this Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Sanders' petition after the district
court, when faced with conflicting evidence about whether Sanders ever requested an appeal,
made a credibility determination and concluded that Sanders failed to communicate his desire to
appeal to counsel. Sanders, 117 Idaho at 940-41, 792 P .2d at 965-66. Here, as noted above, it is
undisputed that, after the jury rendered its verdict, Gosch requested that his counsel "appeal
everything" and the record shows that counsel understood that Gosch desired to appeal.
While the district court concluded that Gosch's failure to schedule an appointment with
counsel as directed and failure to respond to correspondence from counsel after he requested that
counsel "appeal everything" excused counsel from filing an appeal, such conclusion goes against
this Court's holding in Beasley. Specifically, we held that if counsel either neglects or refuses to
file an appeal despite a criminal defendant's request to do so, counsel is deficient. Beasley, 126
Idaho at 362, 883 P.2d at 720. Whether counsel was able to make contact with Gosch after the
jury rendered its verdict and Gosch requested that counsel "appeal everything," absent an express
withdrawal of such request, counsel was required to file an appeal. 3
The district court's conclusion that lack of contact with Gosch after he requested that
counsel "appeal everything" excused counsel from filing an appeal is also contrary to the holding
of the United States Supreme Court that:
We have long held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from
the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally
unreasonable. See Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 89 S. Ct. 1715, 23 L.
Ed. 2d 340 (1969); cf. Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 28, 119 S. Ct. 961,

3

We also note that Gosch appeared at sentencing with counsel. Gosch's counsel testified
at the hearing on Gosch's petition for post-conviction relief that, just prior to sentencing, counsel
reviewed the presentence investigation report with Gosch but did not discuss the possibility of an
appeal. Further, Gosch's counsel testified that she did not discuss the possibility of an appeal
with Gosch after sentencing and entry of the judgment of conviction.
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143 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1999) ("[W]hen counsel fails to file a requested appeal, a
defendant is entitled to [a new] appeal without showing that his appeal would
likely have had merit"). This is so because a defendant who instructs counsel to
initiate an appeal reasonably relies upon counsel to file the necessary notice.
Counsel's failure to do so cannot be considered a strategic decision;filing a notice
of appeal is a purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention to
the defendant's wishes.

Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (emphasis added). Additionally, to require that,
after a defendant makes a specific request that counsel file an appeal after the jury renders its
verdict, the defendant must schedule an appointment with counsel if directed to do so or respond
to attempted correspondence from counsel before such request will be honored permits counsel
to condition the filing of an appeal upon such requirements.

This goes against precedent

indicating that the decision whether to prosecute an appeal rests with the defendant. See Mata v.

State, 124 Idaho 588,593,861 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Ct App. 1993).
Again, it is undisputed that in this case, after the jury rendered its verdict in Gosch's
underlying criminal case, Gosch requested that counsel "appeal everything." The record shows
that Gosch's counsel understood that Gosch desired to appeal and, thereafter, never filed an
appeal.

We hold that, when a defendant makes an unequivocal request that counsel file an

appeal after the jury renders its verdict, counsel has an obligation to file such appeal unless the
defendant thereafter expressly communicates to counsel that he or she no longer wishes to pursue
the appeaL Here, there is no evidence that Gosch did so. 4 Thus, because Gosch's counsel did
not file an appeal despite Gosch' s unequivocal request that counsel do so after the jury rendered
its verdict and Gosch did not expressly withdraw his request, we conclude that deficient
performance of counsel deprived Gosch of the opportunity to appeal and that prejudice is
presumed from such performance. Therefore, the district court erred by dismissing Gosch's
petition for post-conviction relief. Gosch's judgment of conviction must be amended to allow
Gosch to perfect a timely appeal.

4

We recognize that, after an appeal is filed, an appellant might abandon his or her desire to
prosecute an appeal and that, presumably, such abandonment could be inferred from conduct
such as failure to communicate with counsel. We need not decide that question here.
7

III.
CONCLUSION
Gosch demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his
counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal in his underlying criminal case. Accordingly, we
vacate the district court's judgment dismissing Gosch's petition for post-conviction relief and
remand to the district court for entry of an amended judgment of conviction consistent with this
opinion. Costs, but not attorney fees, are awarded to Gosch as the prevailing party on appeal.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCUR.
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1

you want me to know about before I decide whether to

2

accept your plea?

4

Honor.

5

6

2

agreement was an agreement on the part of the

3

prosecutor as to what he wouid recommend, I told hir

4

that judge is not bound by that, that he can do

The Defendant: I don't think so, Your

3

A. What I told him was that the p1ea

1

5

whatever he wants to. That's why he gets to wear the

6

black robe.

The Court: Do you still wish to plead
guilty?

7

The Defendant: Yes, sir.

7

8

The Court: Very well, sir, Based on

8

did tell him that at the time of the change of plea

9

as read into the record earlier?

9

that record, I'm satisfied that your plea of guilty

Q. Isn't it true that, in fact, the judge

10

is given knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

10

A. That's true.

11

I direct clerk to enter your guilty plea of record,

11

Q. Did you tell him anything else about
what the judge's role in the plea agreement was?

12

and based on your plea, I will find you guilty of

12

13

driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs,

13

A. I don't believe so.

14

a repeated offense, as set out in the December 6,

14

Q. Was it your -- was it your understanding

15

2007, information.
Q. Thank you, Mr. Dewey. I'll go back to

16

15

that Mr. Papse understood that the judge was not

16

bound by the plea agreement?

17

the transcript in just a second, but there's a couple

17

A. Yes.

18

of other things that I want to talk about

18

Q. Why do you think that he understood

19

specifically regarding Mr. Papse's allegations.

19

20

20

Did you at any time tell your client at

21

the time, Mr. Papse, that the plea agreement included

21

that?

A. Well, because I explained to him in
detail and the judge later explained it to him as

22

the judge being on board, so to speak?

22

well. I explained to him that plea agreement as far

23

A. No. I never did.

23

as the two plus two recommendation was just the

24

Q. What did you tell him, if anything,

24

recommendation of the prosecuting attorney, that it

25

was up to the judge what he did with that

25

about the judge's role in the plea agreement?
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1

recommendation,

1

explained them to him as far as you know?

3

A. Based on his responses that he gave me

4
5

when we were fi!!ing out the agreement and what he

6

did in court, I believe that he understood that.

7
8

2

Q. Did he understand those things when you

2

3
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4
5

assertion that you told him that the plea agreement

A. Well, then there would be no plea
agreement or no plea of guilty.
Q.

A. No.

8

Q. He also alleges that his answers during

9

Did that happen in this case?

his change of plea were not true and that he parroted

10

and mimicked what his attorney said. Is that your
impression of that day?

11

you know what he could be asserting there or what he

11

might be referencing?

12

A. Well, I did tell him that he had to

by the court?

7

12
13

What if it wasn't filled out or accepted

6

Q. Now, Mr. Dewey, Mr. Papse makes the

the district court as instructed by the attorney. Do

Q.

"----·-- ------=---------

9 , was contingent upon him answering questions posed by
10

7

questionnaire and it had to be accepted by the court.

13

A. No, it's not. When we filled out the
plea agreement we spent, like I said, a considerable

14

complete the questionnaire in order for his plea to

14

amount of time making sure that they were accurate

15

be accepted.

15

and understood the questions, When he was in court I

Q. Is that standard for you to tell your

16

17
18

clients?

A. Yes. You have to fill out the

16

think that he had some trouble not so much hearing

17

but being able to hear the questions that were being

18

asked. So I just simply went through the questions.

19

questionnaire, and If the questionnaire is not

19

You know, when he responded In a way that wasn't

20

responsive in some regards -- in other words, if you

20

consistent with his form on some of the questions, I

21

say that it's not voluntarily entered, then the

21

would talk briefly with him to make sure that he

22

court's not going to the accept it.

22

understood it, and when he did, make sure that he

23

changed that response.

23

24
25

Q. So when he says that the plea agreement
was contingent upon that, what would that mean?

A. That meant that he had to fill out the
Page 31

24
25

Q. Did he change that response in reaction
to any type of threat or coercion from you?
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